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INTERVIEW WITH TERRY EAGLETON
Patrice Petro and Andrew Martin
T erry  Ea g l e t o n  Is one o f Britain’s foremost literary critics and an interna­
tionally renow ned M arxist scholar. He is a lecturer in English at the Universi­
ty o f Oxford and a Fellow o f W adham College. He is also the author of 
num erous articles, far too num erous to list here, and o f the following books: 
Shakespeare and Society
 (1967), Exiles and Emigres (1970), Myths of Power: A Marxist 
Study of the Brontes (1975), Marxism and Literary Criticism (1976), Criticism and 
Ideology (1976), Walter Benjamin: Or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism (1981), The 
Rape of Clarissa: Writing, Sexuality, and Class Struggle in Samuel Richardson (1982), 
Literary Theory (1983), The Function of Criticism (1984). As an Ida Beam Lecturer, 
Eagleton recendy delivered three addresses at the University o f Iowa during 
Septem ber 1984: “Criticism and the Public Sphere,” “M arx or Derrida,” and 
“The Future o f Criticism.” The following interview was conducted during 
Eagleton’s stay in Iowa.
I wonder if  we might begin by discussing the milieu in which you developed as an 
intellectual and critic. Perhaps you could also tell us a bit about your relationship with 
Raymond Williams, since his working class background and experiences at Cambridge 
seem in many ways similar to your own.
I came from Salford, which is near Manchester, and my grandparents had 
come over to the mill towns o f Lancashire as part o f the great Irish m igra­
tion. During the Depression they moved into the cities and eventually ended 
up in Salford. So my parents were first generation English, although still with 
a strong Irish cultural background. My father was an engineering worker in 
what were then the largest engineering works in the country.
It was highly unusual in those days for someone to come from that kind 
o f background, from  what was then a gram m ar school, to Cambridge. I went 
to Cambridge in 1961 and was, I suppose, thoroughly traumatized by it 
culturally in a way not dissimilar to the experiences o f Raymond Williams. 
In those days Cambridge was even m ore visibly a bastion for upper class 
culture than it is today. There was a small percentage o f working class 
students, students who were very much on the defensive, very much o f an
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enclave. Political activity was obviously one way out. At the time it would 
have been mainly the early nuclear disarm am ent movement, something I 
became involved with at Cambridge. There was also a Labour Club, al­
though it was run largely by ex-public school m arxists—Etonian marxists!— 
and so a certain am ount o f interesting friction existed between, as it were, 
the genuine “prols” and those who had gone over to their side.
I m et Williams while I was an undergraduate. He had come to Cambridge 
as a Fellow o f Jesus College the same year I did and he seemed to me, as 
I first encountered him in lectures, to be the only m em ber o f the faculty to 
be talking any sort o f language I could recognize. He was, to be precise, 
simply discussing literature in a way I found at once very difficult and 
unaccustomed to and yet which seemed to plug into what I felt I knew. So, 
when I graduated from  Cambridge in 1964, Williams invited me to become 
a Research Fellow at his college and I taught there with him until 1969 when 
I left for Oxford.
That was a very interesting period because it m eant that I lived through 
the various political developments in the 1960s really actively working with 
Williams and with a num ber o f students such as Stephen Heath and Colin 
MacCabe, for instance, who have since become well-known. So quite a lot 
came out o f that period. But I think one problem  was that Williams, while 
enormously influential on my developm ent—and certainly I think he was 
the single m ost im portant intellectual, political, and in m any ways m oral 
influence on me at the time—had him self had a curious career. He had been 
in adult education and come in from  that to the university fairly late. He had 
actually been offered a Fellowship on the basis o f his Culture and Society. He 
never really adjusted to academia, however, and there was a m om ent in the 
late 1960s when he had around him a group o f radical socialist students and 
critics who would have very much liked to organize some kind o f interven­
tion into the Cambridge English Faculty, had he given the word. But I think 
the irony was that Williams himself had had to learn to work independently 
and he was, in a certain sense, properly weary o f what had happened to 
Scrutiny. And there seemed the possibility that a similar situation, although 
certainly m ore political, could have occurred again and Williams did not 
want to be involved in that. The various people around him then moved off 
to other places, mainly the red brick or new universities in Britain. And I 
moved to Oxford in 1969, partly because I still preserved much o f the 
pathological antipathy to Cambridge, which I felt from  the outset, and partly 
because, having worked in a trem endously productive way with Williams,
1 wanted to see how I could run things on my own. It was also becoming 
clear that the Cambridge English Faculty would not in fact give me a lecture­
ship which, in those days at least, was necessary for financial reasons. (As 
a Fellow o f the College I did some teaching but I was not a Lecturer.) Part 
o f their refusal was, I think, an indirect attack on Williams himself, as I was 
identified with him. He was too powerful and influential a figure to be
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directly assaulted, although one or two o f his colleagues and students were 
not. In a curious way, that was an earlier version o f the later situation known 
as the MacCabe Affair, although it never reached such dramatic proportions.
Until about 1968 or 1969, you were clearly engaged with questions orginally raised 
by Williams in Culture and Society and The Long Revolution. In the late sixties 
and early seventies, however, you shifted your concerns towards developments within 
French theory. Would you explain this shift in terms of contemporary political or social 
events?
Looking back at the time it felt simply like moving from  one body o f theory 
to another, although one can see now the political determ inants o f that 
move. As the political scene was quickening in Europe and in the United 
States, and as new bodies o f theory were developing, there was a younger 
generation o f socialists, o f which I was one, who then felt that the older New 
Left, o f which Williams was a prototype, was neither sufficiently theoretically 
rigorous nor sufficiently politically engaged. I think my own movement 
towards m arxism dates from  that period. Certainly I don’t think I would 
have called m yself a m arxist when I first came to Cambridge, but I clearly 
would have by the middle to late sixties. In an interesting way, I think that 
if one looks at the whole trajectory, what happened is that a num ber o f us 
m oved into what we took to be a m ore rigorous and in some ways m ore 
politically relevant form  o f theory and, from  that perspective, it looked as 
though Williams was standing still, or perhaps even regressing. But it is 
dangerous to think you have preem pted or got beyond Williams because he 
has a curious knack of, by apparently standing still, actually holding a 
position which you end up endorsing, or at least some version o f it. And it 
is interesting if one looks at the way the theory o f politics has developed 
since then: into forms o f French or Althusserian marxism in the late sixties 
and early seventies and then out again in the very changed conditions o f the 
later seventies. Williams was in a sense prefiguring, in much o f his work, the 
kinds o f positions and forms o f allegiance that people might now find 
themselves with. I would not want, however, to simply negate the sort o f 
critique o f Williams’s work that I wrote in Criticism and Ideology. I think that 
a lot o f that critique, theoretically speaking, still stands. But what I did not 
see then, and what I have come to see since because o f developing condi­
tions, is no t a m atter o f theoretical difference with Williams but rather 
agreem ent with the political force o f his work: his attitude towards the 
critic’s role in the academy, his attitude about what literary criticism should 
be, and even his stance toward cultural studies and the need to transgress 
disciplinary boundaries. All o f that was strikingly present in Williams’s work, 
at least in embryonic form, from  the outset. And it is those elements o f 
Williams’s work that people like myself are now returning to under different 
conditions, and they are really m ore im portant than the kinds o f theoretical 
or doctrinal distinctions that we had previously. I would just add, as a final
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note, that Williams himself, o f course, hasn’t actually stood still since the 
sixties either. Williams is m uch closer to marxism now than he ever was, 
apart from  the very brief, and not very fortunate, period o f his active 
m embership in the Communist Party as a student. I think that Williams’s 
work is, so to speak, effectively and objectively m arxist work, whatever label 
we might strategically use for that.
Your valorization of Williams's work nevertheless seems to me surprising, since, as you 
have indeed noted, Williams works in isolation from not only the academy but also 
from what might potentially develop into a counter-public sphere. How, then, is he able 
to be as politically effective as you suggest?
It is a strong part o f Williams’s image, that quality o f isolation. There is a 
sense in which he has been a kind o f eminence grise on the left in Britain, and 
largely with very positive effects, although o f course with some very negative 
ones as well. But what I realize now, m ore strongly that I did before, is that 
Williams is him self aware o f his own isolation and actually makes this clear 
in his interview with New Left Review in Politics and Letters. His own isolation 
is very much the effect o f a counter-public sphere, as it were, failing to come 
into existence. And I was struck by the way he talked, in very distanciating 
terms, about his earlier work in Culture and Society because he identified the 
political m om ent, the historical m om ent, as being for him very negative. 
W hat then happened, as the 1960s and 1970s drew on, was the emergence 
o f new political developments in which Williams was involved. Certainly the 
resurgence o f the New Left around the peace m ovem ent and the various 
kinds o f interventions during the period o f the Labour governm ent o f the 
1960s were part o f this. And even today Williams has played an active part 
in the organization in Britain called the “Socialists’ Society,” which is an 
attem pt to organize intellectuals o f various kinds and to put their work at 
the service o f the trade union m ovem ent and the Labour m ovem ent general­
ly. So he has had that history o f involvement, but I think that at the same 
time the sense o f the earlier dissociation rem ained and proved something 
that he could never truly get beyond. But I think it is interesting to put the 
problem  not only, as it were, psychologically, but also in terms o f the failure 
o f the emergence o f the m aterial conditions which could have m ade Wil­
liams an even m ore influential figure than he has been.
It sounds like Politics and Letters contains many revelations for you, in spite of the 
fact that you worked very closely with Williams during those years.
Yes, part o f Williams’s political isolation, and his isolation in the academy, 
was the result o f what we might politely call a rather civilized or enigmatic 
discourse. And indeed there were ways I took this on in my critique o f him 
in Criticism and Ideology, ways in which his very style o f discourse was related 
to that isolation. That is, somebody who is speaking, and for a long time was 
forced to speak, a language that was not popular, which could easily be
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m isinterpreted, and what was also, to some degree, a language o f self­
protection. I am therefore struck by the way that o f all his work, Politics and 
Letters is the one in which he is the most candid, where in the company of 
comrades, so to speak, he talked openly about his career. One other point 
about Williams which is relevant is that I think it is a mistake to search, as 
often people have done, for the private m an behind the public persona, 
because Williams has always been someone who sees his life in historical 
terms and in often quite distanciating ways. If there are losses in that or 
problems, problems o f accountability, there have also been some gains. 
Williams has been able to solve or negotiate certain problems by himself by 
seeing them  as historical necessities—while never once being fatalistic. One 
o f the other im portant things about his work as a whole, although it often 
has a steely realism about it, is that he has never succumbed to the various 
tides o f fashionable post-marxist pessimism, which from time to time drift 
around our societies.
An interesting thing about Williams is his attraction for American culture. But there 
is a tension in his view of America as at once an ideal and at the same time as a certain 
political reality, particularly vis-a-vis Britain.
Yes, Williams has been notable for his ability to rem em ber the progressive 
m om ents within the m ost negative o f cultures or bodies o f thought. After 
all, Culture and Society was, am ong other things, the record of a highly 
conservative line o f thought from which, by some feat o f dialectics, Williams 
was able to abstract a positive m oment. He has always had that intellectual 
and political breadth o f vision and, in terms o f his response to American 
culture, it marks him off from, say, the Frankfurt School, where the assump­
tion o f a much m ore one-sided attitude towards contem porary capitalist 
culture is prevalent. Sometimes I think Williams has been seen as over- 
charitable in that respect, sometimes moving close to left-liberalism. But 
then he also has been from  the very start a genuinely dialectical thinker, with 
a genuinely dialectical cast to his work which has always sought to start, as 
Brecht put it, from  the bad new things rather than the good old things.
The concept of the “disinterested” intellectual is ever present in the contemporary 
academy, at once an ideal, a standard to be met, but also a way of maintaining an 
atomized university structure. You trace this position in Literary Theory back to the 
Victorian (<man of letters. ” Why do you think this ideal continues to have such force 
in the present-day academy ?
I think that notions o f disinterestedness begin to crop up in the 18 th century 
with what Jurgen Haberm as calls the emergence o f the bourgeois public 
sphere, and what is striking about that disinterestedness is its obvious inter­
estedness. That is to say, only those who have an “interest” can be disinter­
ested, only those who have a stake in the culture, who are propertied, have 
a title to enter into a certain “disinterested” form of discourse—the whole
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discourse o f the Enlightenment, for example. So what one is looking at in 
that whole history becomes visible as a highly elitist and exclusionist class 
form ation—although certainly one which, like m any class formations, needs 
to cast its language in universal terms. The role o f disinterestedness is most 
forcefully understood today in terms o f that history. W hat happens with the 
growth o f the commodification o f literature, which was taking place through­
out the 18th century, is that there is now a sense, because o f the existence 
o f the text or writing as a commodity, in which literature is in principle 
available to everybody—whatever the actual restrictions o f social access to 
literature and power. Nonetheless, the commodification o f literature (and 
this is a reversion to a dialectical position held by Williams) actually liberates 
literary production from a very specific range o f interested institutions—the 
court and organized religion, for exam ple—when it was a part o f the previ­
ous feudalist, absolutist epoch, only to abandon it to the m arket place. 
Ironically, then, and by a striking contradiction, the very possibility of 
disinterestedness as a critical concept, as an intellectual posture, depends 
upon a sort o f promiscuous availablity o f the literary commodity. Anybody 
is capable o f judging it, any “gentlem an” that is. And this situation itself, in 
turn, is an effect o f commodity production. If one looks at the history in that 
way, then one sees where the so-called disinterested intellectual comes from. 
W hat I’ve tried to do in my lectures and in The Function of Criticism is to go 
on to trace the destiny o f the concept into the 19th century and beyond. I 
think that the great crisis, the crisis around M atthew Arnold, for example, 
is, am ong other things, that it becomes implausible either to believe that you 
can transcend sectional and social interests (because the conflicts between 
those interests have intensified) or to believe that there is any longer a total 
body o f social and intellectual knowledge on which intellectuals can get a 
fix, as it were, transcendentally. And it seems to me that one o f the problems 
that dogged the institution o f criticism, and no doubt a plurality o f intellectu­
al areas, is that either you try fruitlessly to reproduce that role o f the disinter­
ested intellectual, in all its various liberal hum anist guises, or you candidly 
recognize that the role is now historically devaluated, it is past, and you try 
to do something else. The problem  is that what that “something else” is 
tends either to be a kind o f craven way for criticism, a kind o f technocracy, 
a specialized, professionalized technocracy which has abandoned any hope 
o f speaking m ore relevantly to a society beyond the academy, or, as with 
the left, you try and work out some other kind o f sets o f functions for 
criticism. I don’t think criticism has solved that problem  yet, and as long as 
it doesn’t follow the path o f the left, I think it is actually structurally incapa­
ble o f doing so.
The role of the “disinterested” intellectual seems to have taken on a new function 
during the Cold War, or perhaps more properly, during the McCarthy Era, when Daniel 
Bell, Arthur Schlesinger and others were tolling the “end of ideology” and attempting
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to construct the university as an apparently value-free institution—one that repre­
sented no particular interest or point of view, but instead the “vital-center. ”
And then in the 1960s, with the arrival o f a m ore heterogeneous body of 
students within the academies, came the breakdown o f a common academic 
language shared between students and the academic com m unity—that was 
the point when the interestedness o f certain apparently disinterested acade­
micians was dramatically exposed. It was also a period in which the complici­
ty o f the academy with military violence, with the destructive technologies, 
with the w ar in Vietnam, was clear to everybody. I think that this is the crisis 
which we have inherited, and that literary theory, in its contem porary 
leanings, springs out o f that period. Theory doesn’t simply happen at any 
time in the history o f a discipline. It happens when, for whatever historical 
reasons, there is a need for that discipline to become self-reflexive: when, 
for example, its traditional rationales have broken down and it needs some 
other rationale, when it needs to establish distance from  itself. If it does that, 
as it had done in literary theory in the 1960s and since, if it becomes self­
reflexive and no longer takes for granted a range o f routinized assets but in 
some way estranges them, then it can have one o f two functions. On the one 
hand, theory can simply reconfirm  those practices, giving them  an even 
m ore solid foundation. (I think some o f the rather de-gutted imitations of 
marxism  and structuralism  and other fancy French products that found their 
way into Britain and the United States have been precisely a way o f doing 
this by giving new injections o f intellectual capital to a clapped-out industry.) 
Alternatively, you can raise the theoretical question in a way that will 
estrange those routinized practices to the point o f changing them. Here we 
are talking less about the Yale School and m ore perhaps about Bertolt 
Brecht.
Currently there is a move in the academy to return to certain roots of German 
theory—athough not the tradition of Brecht and the Frankfort School, but to the 
tradition of hermeneutics variously associated with Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, and, 
if it becomes marxist, Habermas. Given your own references to Habermas, we were 
wondering whether you believe that hermeneutics—a marxist hermeneutics—can 
resolve the double bind of criticism you have described?
As a prelim inary footnote here, as we begin to talk about German and 
French traditions, I think that it is interesting and somewhat ironic that the 
only role left to Anglo-American societies may be to serve as the meeting 
point o f those two uncommunicating traditions. Since the French and Ger­
mans don’t seem to talk to each other, then we might have to conduct the 
dialogue for them. Hermeneutics is no t as popular or as discussed in Britain 
as it is in the United States, so I am always struck when I come to the U.S. 
to find that it is around and very much discussed, and I begin to ponder the 
political context to explain why this might be so. I think that some reasons
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seem to be fairly clear. Hermeneutics, it goes without saying, raises questions 
o f fundam ental importance about interpretation. It is also the case, however, 
that there are forms o f hermeneutics which blend very easily with a kind o f 
mild academic liberal hum anism  in this country which, in one sense, while 
apparently raising every conceivable question and being very anxious to 
question-raise, never seems to me to raise the questions which really hurt, 
and I think that may be one possibly accurate reason for the rapid absorp­
tion o f certain forms o f hermeneutics into the academy. I think that there 
is a problem  about what hermeneutics is. Obviously it would be something 
o f a category mistake to say that, as m arxist criticism is produced, it is in 
fact a hermeneutics because, it seems to me, if hermeneutics is a reflection 
on interpretation it also engages questions com m on to a num ber o f different 
critical approaches. I think it is therefore ironic that some academics and 
intellectuals do seem to w ant to make o f hermeneutics, as it were, a third 
position or another position, one that can only be explained politically in 
terms o f a rejection o f (or a reaction to) such critical positions as marxism. 
Therefore, the first question one has to raise to a hermeneuticist, and we 
know that they love people raising questions so I’m  sure they wouldn’t be 
offended by this, is what exact status do you think your discourse has? And 
I think one problem  there is that it is a discourse o f a high level o f generality, 
raising certain fundam ental issues about the act o f interpretation but stand­
ing at a rather disabling distance from  ways o f applying it in practical ways, 
both textually and politically. To raise yet another question: obviously her­
meneutics has been politically interrogated, not least o f all in the famous 
Gadamer-Habermas confrontation, and has raised questions o f ideology and 
o f the unproblem atic assumption o f a tradition in which hermeneutics seems 
complicitous. But beyond these questions there is the question o f the politics 
o f history, the political implications o f and assumptions in, for example, the 
recovery o f the past or the recovery o f lost or semi-lost meaning. That is to 
say, it seems to me that the recovery or reconstruction o f the m eaning of 
past texts has to be a good deal m ore historical and political than m ost forms 
o f hermeneutics one comes across seem to believe. I don’t see why it should 
be a paradigm  for cultural studies. And I think that in that sense the appar­
ently neutral methodology o f hermeneutics, which simply says that we 
should raise questions about the m eaning o f the past and its relation to the 
present, can actually license a kind o f program  or critical activity which 
continually swerves back to classical texts, which is continually interested in 
the relationship between past and present, but only conceived o f in a particu­
lar way.
Now here I’d like to make two points. First, there are, after all, other ways 
o f relating the past to the present than the most familiar ways o f herm eneu­
tics. There are the m ore dramatic and violent hermeneutics o f W alter Benja­
min, whose whole conception o f the relationship between past and present 
is m ore political, m ore apocalyptic, and certainly m ore historically urgent
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than much o f what one finds coming out o f Germany now. Second, although 
marxists are o f course concerned to question the relation between present 
and past meaning, I think for marxists these are questions always subordi­
nated to another question— one that tends not to be asked by herm eneu­
tics—namely, the question o f the future. There is no view o f the present or 
the past for m arxism  (or I think for other kinds o f viable positions) which 
is not under the sign o f a possible or desirable future. In one sense that may 
seem to be a strange thing to say because quite obviously the future, in a 
material sense, does not exist. But then neither does the past. W hat I m ean 
is that in the making o f such relations between past and future, we have to 
calculate-in where we are trying to get to in the first place. And it is this 
future-oriented dimension which I find lacking, not only in herm eneutical 
thinking, but in m any forms connected to it.
You have been talking about a different vision of past and present in terms of thefuture, 
and thus raise the question of what you mean in your own work by “history ” and 
“tradition. ” For example, in Criticism and Ideology you speak, as a marxist, of 
feeling acutely “bereft of a tradition” To quote you directly, you say that you feel, as 
a marxist, ((a tolerated home guest of Europe, a precocious but parasitic alien. ” In 
W alter Benjamin: O r Towards a Revolutionary Criticism, on the other hand, 
you speak about a real distinction between history and tradition, in the Benjaminian 
sense of the difference between history, or the time of the ruling classes, and tradition, 
or the time of the oppressed and exploited. Finally in Literary Theory, you seem to 
fulfill the promise suggested in W alter Benjamin; that is, there seems to emerge in 
your work a certain tradition of marxist criticism. Could you comment a bit more on 
your views of history and tradition and the place of Literary Theory in forging a 
marxist tradition?
I would now want to look a bit critically at some o f the generalizations I 
m ade in Criticism and Ideology, because often I was referring to the endemic 
empiricism and anti-intellectualism o f British culture which resisted the sorts 
o f traditions I believe I was—and now am —working within. I perhaps was 
no t sufficiently aware that I was really only speaking o f the tradition of 
theory, and that should never be for a marxist the first or m ajor way o f 
speaking o f tradition. But after all there is an im portant and impressive 
tradition o f British socialism, o f working class and other forms o f militancy 
and it was, perhaps, at that m om ent in the 1970s, part o f my taking distance 
from  Williams, that I really d idn’t dare take in the full weight o f that. I wasn’t 
really raising the question o f how my own work related to that indigenous 
political tradition which my m arxism  tended to underplay—and I would like 
to correct the balance.
W hat I would w ant to say about tradition now from  a m arxist point o f 
view is how im portant a concept it is. Perhaps this is m ore than stating the 
obvious. There was, after all, in the great explosion of radical thought and 
practice in the 1960s, and for all its futility, a valuable skepticism about the
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very idea o f tradition which was sometimes all that one was trying to break 
away from. Thus a kind o f eternal “nowness” finds later resonances not in 
the euphoric or hippie style, but in certain forms o f contem porary left talk 
which seems to fetishize something called “present conjucture” where, as it 
were, everything rests on the roll o f the dice in the present conjucture. 
Williams said long ago, I think in Culture and Society, that a society that can 
live only by contem porary resources is poor indeed. And I think that it is 
a structural effect o f late bourgeois societies that they m ust repress history, 
because they must suppress alternative forms o f history and also that their 
history tends to be the history o f the same, tends to be the eternal return 
o f the commodity in whatever fashionably varied guise that returns. So the 
first point would simply be to underline the vital nature o f the concept of 
tradition for marxists. “We m arxists,” Trotsky once said, “have always lived 
in tradition.” This o f course is not to signal the uncritical or subservient 
relations of tradition which one finds, characteristically, in conservative 
thinking. I think, yes, Benjamin’s distinction between history, m eaning I 
suppose ruling class history and tradition or an alternative sort o f histories, 
was very im portant to me because it m ade some sense o f what I think is a 
problem with the British left, where there has been over the past ten or 
fifteen years a lot o f working class, labour, and now feminist history, a lot 
of work in alternative history largely stemming from  the History W orkshop 
movement. Now, one o f the criticisms m ade o f that m ovem ent is that one 
can fall into the trap o f seeing tradition, o f seeing socialist o r radical tradi­
tion, simply as an alternative in the sense o f some suppressed but unbroken 
alternative continuity which, as it were, “ghosts” official history. And I think 
that Benjamin’s own thinking about tradition, about the resources o f the 
oppresed, is a way o f breaking with that model. Because I think Benjamin’s 
tradition is much less an alternative, ghostly history which could be blocked 
out whole and entire (as I think some labour historians and some feminist 
historians tend to think) than a set of, if you like, crises within history itself: 
a set o f points o f confrontation, o f rupture or conflict, where you can see 
the outline o f an alternative w ithout having to parrot it. His tradition is then 
the assemblage o f those m om ents which are always for him reassembled and 
reconstructed according to the dem ands o f the present conjuncture. So I 
want to come back to the “present conjuncture” in that way but through 
that different perspective.
On yet another related subject, we wanted to ask you about your view of rhetoric, again 
drawing upon your views in W alter Benjamin and Literary Theory. In W alter 
Benjamin, you equate rhetoric with deconstruction and, with references to de Man, 
argue that rhetoric has retreated from politics and social practice and become a 
demystifier of ideology that itself proves the “final ideological rationale for political 
i ne r t i a I n  Literary Theory, by contrast, you explicitly appropriate rhetoric for 
purposes of political criticism and an entirely different kind of discursive practice. 
Would you comment upon these two different views of rhetoric in your recent work?
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I think the apparent disparity emerges from  the fact that there are different 
meanings o f rhetoric and, indeed, I think the term  is now certainly up for 
political grabs. Rhetoric is the site o f struggle rather than a received defini­
tion. The rhetorical tradition itself is a set o f quite varied traditions and what 
I was trying to pinpoint in the Benjamin book was really two, I think, quite 
politically incompatible notions o f rhetoric. One is the use o f the term  to 
indicate discourse as power and perform ance and therefore as always con- 
junctural, as always inscribed within institutions. The other meaning of 
rhetoric, which since Nietzsche, is precisely the one identified in its latest 
form  with de Man, views discourse as the play o f tropes and calls into 
question not only the possibility o f meaning itself but indeed the possibility 
o f practice. That is to say, behind that Nietzschean insistence, that Nietzs- 
chean impulse inherited by m any contem porary deconstructionists, lies a 
skepticism about the very coherence, about the foundedness o f the concept 
o f practice which cannot but be political. And again, this skepticism seems 
to me a coded response to or a polemic against materialist theories of 
practice. Now it clearly isn’t our point to stand, as some marxists have done, 
on a concept o f concrete practice which then is seen to solve all the prob­
lems. Clearly, practice is as difficult, ambiguous, and many-sided as anything 
else. I think that one has to understand the impulse behind that neo-Nietzs- 
chean attem pt to deconstruct practice which, were it successful, would spell 
the death o f any effective social transform ation. If what is being said is 
simply a kind o f therapeutic interrogation o f certain over-simple, rather 
fetishized, notions o f practice, then I think that marxists and other radicals 
can learn from  deconstruction. But I don’t think that this is what is being 
said. So I believe that one m ust return  to a theory o f rhetoric which, while 
no t for a m om ent suppressing the problems o f over simplification or am bi­
guity, nevertheless begins from  a grasp o f the fact that rhetoric is indeed the 
nexus between discourse and power.
In your own work you are interested in the formal devices of literature, or what we 
might term “cultural production, ” and also with the ways in which these devices are 
activated in reception, or what we might call “cultural consumptionDoes your 
interest in reception differ—and if so, in what way—from what has recently been 
rather broadly termed “reception theory”? And how would you respond to those 
attempts, as represented by the work of Tony Bennett and other marxist critics, to 
redirect reception theory in a more radical, more politically relevant, direction?
It may be interesting to see reception theory, like all other contem porary 
literary practices, again having its roots back in the 1960s. W hat we are really 
saying is that readers dem and participation, just as within that climate 
dem ands for democratic participation o f various kinds were clearly very 
strong. In other words it is part, and in principle a greater than usual part, 
o f the dethroned mythology o f literature. And I think it would be interesting 
to trace the developm ent o f that theory in the various institutional changes,
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Idemands, and program s which are characteristic o f the 1960s. At the same 
time, I think that one has to say that not only has much standard European 
reception theory, and American reception theory for that m atter, been 
criticized for positing a reader who is, very often, merely a function of 
contem porary reading formations and not a function o f the whole political 
system as well. But it is clear that we are never simply readers, that we are 
never simply in the first place readers. Nor can we put magically into 
suspension the rest o f our existence when we approach a text. There is a 
danger o f a kind o f left-academicism there, which would seem to presume 
that the classroom, if you like, is the only place in which meanings are 
constructed. And that obviously has to be challenged. The other problem  
in relation to the work o f left reception theories, which you have touched 
upon in your question, is indeed the emphasis on consumption which can, 
from time to time, lead to a kind o f carnival o f consumerism or fetishism 
o f the immediate reading conjucture. This can be just as narrowly de- 
historicized in its own way as the m ore standard forms o f bourgeois criti­
cism. We are always m ore than the current reading conjuncture. It is partly 
a m atter o f how far we extend the word “reception.” Now, a lot o f the 
epistemological problems raised in those arguments are perhaps nearing a 
kind o f solution or at least a consensus: for example, I think the meaning 
o f the phrase “the text in itself ” is now one that m ost o f us would reject. 
It is clearly essentialistic. I think that there are equally certain forms of 
voluntarism o f reading and interpretation, apparently based on a plurality 
o f interpretations, which m ost o f us would also want to reject. So I think 
there is a certain am ount o f com m on ground here too. But after those 
explorations are over I think that still one has to return  to what is at stake 
for marxists: the ownership, o r at least control of, the means o f cultural 
production. That brings the focus to an im portant problem  in being an 
oppositional critic. In one sense, working within the academy as an opposi­
tional critic you are always in danger o f being merely reactive to cultural 
work, or cultural phenom ena, produced elsewhere. And that is structural to 
the academy, however much you may rightly talk o f certain kinds o f cultural 
production within the academy—and such talk is m ore widely done in the 
United States than it is in Europe. Then there is the question o f when, for 
example, we take a film text and demystify it, or when we take a literary 
text and do an ideological analysis o f it, o f w hether what we are doing is 
m ore valid. That is to say, w hether such unmasking can reveal certain 
dom inant meanings so as to prevent them  from  entering the general uncon­
scious unchallenged. And that task is something vital, I think, which one has 
to defend. But at the same time it has its built-in limits and I don’t think a 
radical critic can in the end be content with that task. We have to be talking 
about the production o f cultural meanings, not only in terms o f artifacts but 
also in terms o f other forms o f production o f cultural meanings. This is the 
long-range perspective. Nonetheless, being an oppositional critic does not
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simply m ean somebody who is in some way involved in academia. It does 
not, in the first place, m ean somebody who takes the already fashioned 
product and submits it to a certain reading, however necessary that may be 
at the moment.
How would you respond, though, to the work represented by Bennett and others, and 
particularly to their argument that marxism shouldn't be concerned with questions of 
aesthetics or aesthetic value? Bennett says, for example, that “the object of marxist 
criticism is not that of producing an aesthetic, of revealing the truth about an already 
pre-established literature, but that of intervening within the social processes of reading 
and writing.”
I think that once one begins to argue with Tony Bennett, once one begins 
to unpack the m eaning o f a phrase like “the social processes o f reading and 
writing,” then one would probably find oneself working with the kinds of 
issues which have been traditionally known as aesthetics. If Tony Bennett 
spells his position out m ore clearly or gives us a little m ore exemplary or 
concrete practice, then I think the sorts o f questions or responsive devices 
and textual operations and effects that one would find oneself with in a 
properly political context—and that is the valuable point o f it—really add 
up to what people really m ean when they use the category “aesthetic.” In 
other words, I think there is a danger in Bennett’s work, and in any work 
o f that kind, o f implicitly subscribing to a bourgeois notion o f aesthetics and 
then properly refusing it. Just as I think there is a danger in much decon- 
structive thinking o f implicitly subscribing to utterly untenable metaphysical 
notions o f truth, o f art, o f presence or ground, and then, o f course, piously 
going on to deconstruct them. Obviously one could play that game for a long 
time. But the term  “aesthetic” is, like m any such terms, too valuable to be 
surrendered to the opposition without a struggle. I don’t think that it is 
enough for a m arxist critic to say, all right, you have your aesthetic dis­
courses and you can keep them, we’re going to do something else: call it 
politics, call it intervention in social processes or whatever. First o f all, I don’t 
think that the word “aesthetic” is that simple. Very often in his work, Tony 
Bennett tends to equate the aesthetic with a certain founding m om ent in the 
history o f G erm an thought, Germ an idealism to be precise, and says quite 
properly that this is clearly untenable and so we w ant to do something else. 
But the word “aesthetic” seems to me a much m ore indeterm inate and 
flexible word than that, one which really tries to analyze the specificity of 
whatever it is that is going on when people say, as they tend to, that they 
are responding to a work o f art, rather than when they say they are digging 
the garden or taking a ride on a bus. It demarcates a certain kind o f social 
practice. Now o f course we know, and here Bennett and I are in agreement, 
that the boundaries o f social practice are historically shifting in the extreme. 
O f course we want to reject essentialistic notions o f aesthetics, but the word 
aesthetic covers a multitude o f areas and responses and those, I think,
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cannot be abandoned. It would have been inconceivable to someone like 
Brecht to say, well I’m  really not concerned with the aesthetic value o f my 
play or poem, what I was really concerned with was w hether it was political­
ly effective. To which the simple answer would be: well, if it was boring, 
tedious, and badly done, how on earth could it have been politically effec­
tive? Those two questions for Brecht, o f the political and the aesthetic, 
simply would not have been so disassociated. By the aesthetic he would have 
m eant something like the production o f certain kinds o f dramatic and textu­
al effects which m ade the political content o f the work acceptable, interest­
ing, exciting, and thought-provoking to particular audiences. So with that 
m eaning o f aesthetic I think one is talking from  a properly leftist point o f 
view.
One assumption is that you can culturally or politically activate texts that would 
otherwise be received in an apparently value-free or “disinterested”fashion. With other 
left reception theorists, such as Peter Burger, however, the assumption is that radical 
meanings are always preempted by conservative institutions. So, in a sense, Bennett's 
work represents an attempt to break with a certain defeatism or incorporationist view 
of texts and institutions.
I think you’re right. And I do think there is a way o f using left reception 
theory to counter the most defeatist forms o f incorporationist arguments 
because, as you point out, they surreptitiously assume that there is a stan­
dard or fixed meaning or value to the institution or the text. I very much 
admire Bennett’s work in trying to break down those assumptions. At the 
same time, I think I would nevertheless agree with Stephen H eath’s insis­
tence that the argum ent about reader response or audience response very 
rapidly settled into a kind o f unacceptable binary opposition between, on 
the one hand, the magically fixed “text in itself ” and, on the other hand, 
as m any different readers as you have texts. And I think Heath was quite 
right to point out that this was really a pseudo-position. Once one looks at 
the formations within which individuals are constituted as readers or viewers 
then the purely voluntaristic gates are throw n open.
I think Bennett’s case is useful in shifting accent upon the calculation of 
textual effects, and so on. But at the same time, he sometimes pushes that 
to the point where it would seem mysteriously unpredictable what effects 
the text was likely to have in certain situations. I think it is at this point that 
I would want to disagree with Bennett and say that, given the formations 
within which readings are constituted, there is m ore predictability than some 
kind of pure reception theory would have us believe.
You have suggested that feminism represents today perhaps the most productive chal­
lenge to the dominant public sphere, particularly because feminism transgresses the 
boundaries of the academy and takes its primary impulse from a political movement 
embracing different groups aimed at countering a range of institutional practices. You
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have also argued that feminism is, in a very real sense, inseparable from marxism, or 
perhaps that marxism is inseparable from feminism, precisely because both speak from 
the margins of history, from a different tradition, and because both engage in a critique 
of power that is at once practical and theoretical. Given the partially sexist history of 
marxism, and given the marginality of both feminism and marxism, where do you see 
feminism in relation to marxist criticism today?
Let me first expand just a bit on the feminism and the public sphere idea. 
I m ean by that n o t only that feminism is radical and does relate beyond the 
academy to a movement, a wider movement, and indeed takes its impulse 
from  it. But what I m ean by the public sphere m ore particularly is not just 
the public arena or, as it were, publicness as such (which is a broader 
definition o f public sphere), but rather that area, that space, in which what 
we m ight perhaps adequately call politics and culture come together. I think 
that it is as part o f the classical bourgeois public sphere that mediations exist 
between the public realm, or the realm  o f institutions, and forms o f subjec­
tivity that have their root in the domestic world which generates new forms 
o f subjectivity. These are, in H aberm as’s phrase, “publically-oriented” and 
then pass over into the male-dominated public sphere to attain self reflective 
formulation. I think it would be very interesting to trace the changing 
relations between the public sphere, the domestic sphere, and the state— 
particularly for us as cultural workers, because culture seems to be the vital 
point o f m ediation between public and private. And if one looks at contem ­
porary feminism in that light, then what I m ean by it being an em ergent set 
o f elements towards a counter-public sphere becomes clear. It is concerned 
with problem s o f utility, relations between experiences or meanings formed 
in the private sphere and those form ed in the political arena. Feminism, as 
does the classical public sphere, grasps these problems o f subjectivity in 
political terms and it does put an im portant emphasis upon culture in the 
sense o f language, experience, and so on, as part o f a very necessary form 
o f it. So feminism is one o f a num ber o f elements, one o f the most im portant 
elements, as one can already see in Raymond Williams’s term  “em ergent,” 
that contributes to the creation o f a possible counter public sphere.
The problem  with talking about feminism and m arxism is that in the 
European context there is often, at least, a certain assumption that feminism 
and marxism, or feminism and socialism, in some way belong together. For 
all the real theoretical and political differences, they inhabit an area on the 
left. They have com m on interests whatever the formal history that links 
them. W hat little work I’ve done in that area, m y book on Richardson 
particularly, really comes out o f that kind o f perspective, which is then 
obviously very different from  what in Britian began as “radical feminism.” 
By radical feminism I m ean that form  o f feminism that no m ore sees any 
particular necessity to address questions o f class struggle than do many 
other forms o f politics. W hat I would hope for is some kind o f convergence
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between marxists and feminists which would not be a m utual appropriation, 
but which would be worked out within the sphere o f political activity; that 
is, within the realm  o f trying to construct a counter-public sphere. And as 
is so often with theoretical questions and political differences, such practice 
would seem to allow for such clarification. I think that one reason feminism 
is so im portant to socialism, and to traditional forms o f it, is that socialism 
must be about not only a handing over o f power, but it m ust be a translation 
o f the very meaning o f power. Any kind o f marxism or socialism that stops 
before that point, as in the post-capitalist bureaucracies o f Eastern Europe, 
would be sorely distorted and disabled. I don’t think it is a question o f 
ceasing to talk altogether, as happens in certain familiar forms o f so-called 
participatory democracy (whether o f a socialist or feminist kind) because 
participatory democracy is a form o f power just like any other form of 
power. The task is to change the meaning o f power itself—even to the point 
where we could now, within our present discourse o f power, be able to 
recognize or identify what might pass for power in that kind o f society. I 
think that really is the goal and to that extent feminism, if I m ight speak 
honesdy from  a m arxist position, is a close rem inder o f that revolution 
within the revolution which signals what is still to be done: it signals to what 
extent the even productive political concepts or strategic concepts are still 
in complicity with the kind o f rationality, the kind o f power structure, that 
feminism is ultimately out to destroy. All o f that for me is its m ajor im por­
tance. And what I have tried to do in the book on Richardson was less to 
write a critical study o f Richardson than to indicate a way in which feminism, 
a certain kind o f post-structuralism, and materialism could come together 
without m utual appropriation. I believe that is possible. But I also believe 
that it is fearsomely difficult in the actual political arena, given the necessary 
vigilances and mutual suspicions that now exist between socialist m en and 
women. On the other hand, one way in which these difficulties might be 
negotiated is by showing, if only at the theoretical level, that something can 
be done which is no t simply an appropriation, and that has quite rightly 
been feared by feminists.
In the conclusion to Literary Theory, you seem to broaden the structuralist concern 
with decentering the subject by calling for a radical de centering of the object of literary 
criticism. To phrase this a bit differently, you seem to suggest the need to redefine the 
concept of literature in such a way as to transgress prevailing disciplinary boundaries. 
Could you elaborate upon what you think the effects of such a decentering would be, 
both in the academic institution and, at least potentially, in the public sphere?
I think it is difficult to talk about this now because o f the real, practical, 
short-term problems involved in any radical transform ation o f the academy. 
Certainly this is so in Britain, where one always feels a sense o f incongruity 
in launching ambitious radical perspectives when what one is really worried 
about is people’s jobs, cuts in the student population, the savage cuts in
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funding, and so on. But I think there are different ways you can go in that 
situation, different strategic ways. I have even heard it seriously suggested 
on the left, by a colleague o f mine in Britain, that what we ought to do is 
defend the concept o f high literature to the death against the philistinism 
o f Thatcher. And, o f course, one can understand that type o f thinking. I 
think that it is the wrong approach nevertheless because the phenom enon 
o f Thatcherism, or its equivalent in the United States, is so challenging that, 
as radicals, we have to try to think it through to the end in order to have 
the kind o f vision and energy to oppose it. I don’t think, however difficult 
the short-term  negotiations are, that you can really oppose that virulent 
form  o f class society with anything less than what you ultimately desire. That 
is why I think there is a point now, if only strategically, in trying to work 
out what it is we would want in the end because that would provide us with 
a set o f guidelines for what we are doing at the m oment. And I think that 
it does have to be a deconstruction o f the institution. W here I find decon- 
structive thought m ost useful is in its approach to the question o f transform ­
ing m odem  institutions. I am  very struck by the manifesto, presumably 
written by Jacques Derrida for the newly founded College International de 
Philosophic. W hatever the political difficulties, whatever the marginalization 
o f the academy, Derrida and his colleagues really do seem to be working 
towards a deconstructed institution where, as it were, the transgression o f 
boundaries, no t only between subject-areas but between academic and social 
practices, would be built into the whole institution. I think that we have to 
find some kind o f equivalent to work toward in the universities that does 
in the end m ean the replacem ent o f the current divisions o f intellectual 
labour by some organized conception that examines the effects o f all forms 
o f discourse in terms o f the power context in which they now exist. And that 
will m ean some new kind o f rhetoric, simply because o f the emormous 
im portance o f those signifying processes. It seems to me that in a post- 
Gramscian era o f bourgeois society there is no way to ignore the central role 
played by symbolic processes o f all kinds, from  advertising to the uncon­
scious, in the reproduction o f bourgeois power. Curiously, in one sense the 
radical critique now involved in the cultural field is a m odest and marginal 
presence—and in a certain way that is appropriate. But what is at stake, in 
the end, is the unlocking o f certain very powerful, very unconscious forms 
o f signification and the construction o f new forms o f identity and the sub­
jects to go with them. There is a sense, then, that what we are trying to do 
now, if in a besieged and defensive way, is prefiguring a very im portant 
future. And I think one should put that quite sharply by saying that without 
the fight on the cultural and ideological front it is unlikely that we are going 
to be able to unlock some o f those lethal arm ed struggles that now politically 
and critically confront us.
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